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Abstract
A new payment system, the diagnosis-related group (DRG) system, and Korean diagnosis procedure combination (KDPC, per-diem)
payment system were ofﬁcially introduced in 2002 and in 2012, respectively. We evaluated the impact of payment system change
from per-case to per-diem on high severity patient’s length of stay (LOS).
Claim data was used. A total of 36,240 case admissions and 72,480 control admissions were included in the analysis. Segmented
regression analysis of interrupted time series between cases and controls was conducted. Hospitals that consistently participated in
the DRG payment system and changed to the KDPC payment system were deﬁned as case hospitals. Hospitals that consistently
participated in the DRG payment system were deﬁned as control hospitals.
LOS increased by 0.025 days per month (P=0.0055) for 3 surgical diagnosis-related admissions due to the bundled payment
system change. LOS among emergency admissions also increased and showed an increasing tendency under the KDPC. The LOS
increase was observed speciﬁcally for complex procedure admissions and high severity cases (CCI 0, 1: 0.022, P=0.0142; CCI 2, 3:
0.026, P=0.0288; CCI≥4: 0.055, P=0.0003).
Although both payment systems are optimized to decrease LOS, incentives to reduce LOS are stronger under the DRG system
than under the KDPC system. It is worth noting that too strong incentive for reducing LOS is suitable to high severity cases.
Abbreviations: AUC = area under the curve, CCI = Charlson comorbidity index, DPC = diagnosis procedure combination,
DRG = diagnosis-related group, FFS = fee-for-service, HIRA = Health Insurance Review and Assessment Service, KDPC = Korean
diagnosis procedure combination, LOS = length of stay, NHI=National Health Insurance, NHIC =National Health Insurance council,
PPS = prospective payment system, SD = standard deviation.
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11. Introduction
It is well known that the system by which purchasers choose to
pay providers has a signiﬁcant impact on the medical decisions
and clinical and professional behavior of providers.[1–4] Due to
this impact, insurance payment systems have been used to achieve
political objectives, such as cost containment and recruitment to
underserved areas.[5,6] Since the introduction of the National
Health Insurance (NHI) in 1977, fee-for-service (FFS) has been
the primary payment system for medical services and supplies in
Korea.[7] Although the Korean government has regulated some
medical costs, including reimbursements to medical suppliers,[8]
health-related spending has increased consistently and sharply.
Both experts and the government have argued that the FFS
system, which offers providers autonomy in medical decision-
making, is the root of uncontrolled health care costs.[3,7–9]
The adoption of a diagnosis-related group (DRG)-based
payment system, which is a form of a case-based prospective
payment system (PPS) under which payment is based on particular
diagnosis for hospital inpatient services,[10] was ofﬁcially proposed
by the task force for health care reform in 1994, partly as a political
move. Since the implementation of the Medicare inpatient care
payment system in the United States in 1983,DRG-based payment
systems have emerged as a popular hospital payment system in
many European countries and other countries worldwide.[11,12]
Compared with the FFS-based payment system, the DRG-based
payment system is a supply-side cost-sharing payment system that
Jang et al. Medicine (2016) 95:37 Medicineincentivizes providers to contain medical expenses by introducing
economic consequences of health care utilization to the provid-
er.[13] The Korean government accepted and started a pilot project
to implement a DRG-based system as a means to contain health
care costs in October 1997.[7] The DRG-based payment system
was ofﬁcially introduced in 2002 for 7 DRG principal diagnoses,
including 3 principal surgical diagnoses (appendicitis, hernia, and
hemorrhoid) on a voluntary basis. The DRG-based payment
system has been mandatory for 7 principal diagnoses since July
2012, and was expanded to include all medical institutes except
long-term care hospitals and public hospitals in July 2013.
Meanwhile, another bundled payment system, the diagnosis
procedure combination (DPC), was introduced in 2009. The
name of this bundled payment system in Korean means “new
DRG.” However, in this study, we have named this bundled
payment system the Korean diagnosis procedure combination
(KDPC), because this system is very similar to the Japanese DPC.
The DPC-based system is a mixed system that includes a ﬂat-rate
(i.e., per-case or per-diem) payment and FFS payment, which
distinguishes the KDPC from the DRG-based system.[14] The
Health Insurance Review and Assessment Service (HIRA), which
is a government agency that reviews claims submitted by
providers, assesses the quality of care provided, and makes
decisions for reimbursement, introduced the KDPC as a payment
system for 550 principal diagnoses admissions at all public
hospitals in July 2012.
Therefore, 3 payment systems currently coexist in Korea. The
government has set a goal to introduce a bundled payment system
as the national basic payment system to contain costs by
transitioning risk to the suppliers. This system is also expected to
improve administrative conveniences. Suppliers are resistant to a
bundled payment system. Furthermore, there is no public consent
about the best system. The National Health Insurance council
(NHIC), which is the top decision-making body of the NHI
contract, suggested a roadmap that would expand a bundled
payment system to combine DRG and KDPC. However,
although several studies have reported the effect of the payment
system change from FFS to DRG[8,10,15–20] and from FFS to
KDPC,[21,22] no studies have directly compared the DRG-based
system with the KDPC-based system. Hence, there exists a need
for a more comprehensive comparison and evaluation of these
systems to determine which system would be more appropriate in
Korea and to inform the overall decision of the NHIC. Although
DRG admissions are forced to reduce length of stay (LOS) for
ﬁnancial reason, KDPC admissions with LOS longer than the
standard LOS also incur a ﬁnancial penalty due to the decreasing
per-diem fee schedule. We had assumed that there are difference
effects between DRG and KDPC on reducing LOS, especially
among high severity admission. So the null hypothesis of this
study is “there are no difference between the effect of LOS of
DRG and KDPC.” Therefore, this study analyzed the impact of
change from DRG to KDPC with a focus on the average LOS. A
difference observed between DRG and KDPC may provide
important evidence for selecting or developing the next-
generation payment system in Korea.2. Methods
2.1. Study design
In this study, hospitals that consistently participated in the DRG
payment system from January 2007 to June 2012 and underwent
a change in payment system to the KDPC payment system from2July 2012 to June 2014 were deﬁned as case hospitals. All case
hospitals are public hospitals because the KDPC has been
implemented in public hospitals only. Hospitals that consistently
participated in the DRG payment system from January 2007 to
June 2014 were deﬁned as control hospitals. All control hospitals
are private hospitals because these hospitals were not required to
change to the KDPC system. Among the 39 public hospitals that
implemented the KDPC payment system, 2 hospitals previously
used an FFS payment system and were excluded from this study.
Two additional hospitals were excluded from the study due to
missing data. Therefore, 35 hospitals were included as case
hospitals in our study. Among 1996 medical institutes that were
paid more than once by the DRG payment system for principal
surgical DRGs, 326 institutes consistently participated in the
DRG payment system. Clinics were excluded because no clinics
were included as case hospitals. Therefore, 60 hospitals were
included as control hospitals in this study. General characteristics
of hospitals are presented in Table S4, http://links.lww.com/MD/
B274, in appendix.
The number of admissions to case hospitals was 39,364 and
the number of admissions to control hospitals was 477,668. We
conducted 1:2 sampling using the propensity score matching
method for age, sex, Charlson comorbidity index (CCI), sub-
DRG, and admission date (month). The area under the curve
(AUC) value was 0.836. A total of 36,240 case admissions and
72,480 control admissions were included in the ﬁnal analysis.
Figure 1 shows the case and control groups during the study
period and the selection of the study population.
The Institutional Review Board of Yonsei University Graduate
School of Public Health approved the study (approval no.
2015–406).2.2. Data and variables
This study used claim data provided by HIRA. Seven principal
DRGs are included in the DRG payment system in Korea.
Surgical principal DRGs include appendectomy (G08), hernia
procedures (G09), and anal procedures (G10). Each principal
DRG includes 4 sub-DRGs (supplementary Table 1, http://links.
lww.com/MD/B274, reports the sub-DRGs by principal DRGs).
The dependent variable in our study is LOS of the admission
case. LOS is a representative index that reﬂects the effectiveness of
admission and is commonly used to evaluate the impact of a
payment system change. Prior studies that have evaluated
payment system change from an FFS-based payment system to
a case-based payment system report a decrease in LOS under
case-based systems. This result is expected due to the difference in
cost-sharing between FFS and bundled payment systems. A case-
based payment system, such as the DRG or KDPC, provides
incentives to reduce LOS for proﬁt maximization. Therefore,
LOS is considered a proper index to estimate differences between
DRG and KDPC in this study. Theoretically, KDPC does not
provide as much incentive to decrease LOS as DRG. Therefore, a
change in LOS due a change from DRG to KDPC may reﬂect
other effects in addition to economic incentives.
Age, sex, region (hospital location), sub-DRG, CCI, season,
and year were included as individual-level covariates. Hospital
type, ownership, teaching status, region, number of beds, number
of doctors, and number of nurses were included as hospital-level
covariates. Age, number of beds, number of doctors, and number
of nurses were included as continuous variables. Sub-DRG
included 12 subgroups (Table S1, http://links.lww.com/MD/
B274). CCI was calculated yearly based on Quan’s methods[23];
Figure 1. Study design and the population selection ﬂow.
Jang et al. Medicine (2016) 95:37 www.md-journal.com19 diseases were classiﬁed into scores of 1, 2, 3, or 6. CCI per
subject was calculated from the sum of all scores. In this study,
CCI was grouped as scores of 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 or more. Four
seasons were included to adjust for seasonal variations due to
known seasonality in temperature and medical service utilization
in Korea. The season variable was created as dummy variable.3Hospital type was classiﬁed as either general hospital or hospital.
The bundled payment fee schedule varies between these 2
hospital types in Korea. Ownership was classiﬁed as public,
corporate, or private. The KDPC was compulsory only in public
hospitals; therefore, there are no private hospitals among the case
hospitals and no public hospitals among the control hospitals. So
Jang et al. Medicine (2016) 95:37 Medicineﬁnally, 31 public hospitals, 4 corporation hospitals, and 0 private
hospitals are included in case, and 28 corporation hospitals and
32 private hospitals are included in control (Tables S2 and S4,
http://links.lww.com/MD/B274). Teaching status (teaching or
non-teaching) and region (urban or rural) were included as
binary variables.2.3. Statistical method
Segmented regression analysis of interrupted time series with
control was carried out for analysis in this study, using the
following equation (Equation 1):
Yt ¼ b0 þ b1 timet þ b2 KDPC implementationt
þ b3 time af ter KDPC implementationt
þ b4 Caseþ b5 timet  Caseþ b6KDPC implementationt  Case
þ b7 time af terKDPC implementationt  Caseþ b8 seasont þ m1Z1 þ   
þ mpZp þ et    ð1Þ
Yt: average length of stay of month tT
G
V
L
A
S
P
C
S
P
Tt: time period (month)
time: a continuous variable started in January 2007 by month
Case: a binary variable (0 control hospitals; 1 case hospitals)
KDPC implementationt: a binary variable (0 before June 2012;
1 after July 2012)able 1
eneral characteristics of admissions after propensity score matchi
ariables Case (n=36,240)
ength of stay (mean, SD) 5.28 ±2.36
ge (mean, SD) 40.8 ±21.3
<10 1949 5.4
10–19 5928 16.4
20–29 4504 12.4
30–39 5079 14.0
40–49 5465 15.1
50–59 5143 14.2
60–67 4268 11.8
≥70 3904 10.8
ex
Male 22,798 62.9
Female 13,442 37.1
rincipal diagnosis
Appendectomy 44,867 61.9
Hernia procedures 11,856 16.4
Hemorrhoid procedures 15,757 21.7
harlson comorbidity index
0 17,416 48.1
1 5987 16.5
2 5013 13.8
3 4228 11.7
≥4 3596 9.9
eason
Spring 9760 26.9
Summer 9617 26.5
Autumn 7707 21.3
Winter 9156 25.3
eriod
2007.1–2008.6 7435 20.5
2008.7–2009.6 4855 13.4
2009.7–2010.6 5007 13.8
2010.7–2011.6 4513 12.5
2011.7–2012.6 4935 13.6
2012.7–2013.6 4589 12.66
2013.7–2014.6 4906 13.54
otal 36,240 33.3
4time after KDPC implementationt: a continuous variable
started in July 2012
Seasont: seasonality (1 spring, 2 summer, 3 autumn, 4 winter)
mpZp: independent variables (1···p)
et= random variation in length of stay across time within
hospital (within hospital variation).
In Equation 1, b6 represents the level of change in the
difference between case and control LOS at the time of KDPC
implementation. b7 represents the trend in the difference between
case and control LOS after KDPC implementation. Equation 1
was implemented in PROC GENMOD (All analyses were
conducted using the SAS statistical software package, version 9.4,
SAS Institute Inc.) as a generalized estimation equation (GEE) and
mixed model with link identity, distribution normal, and AR(1).3. Results
Before propensity score matching, all variables were signiﬁcantly
different between cases and controls. Table 1 presents the general
characteristics of the study population following the application
of propensity score matching methods for age, sex, sub-DRG,
and CCI. In addition, the time of the outcome was also included
as a matching variable in order to implement time-series analysisng (n, %).
Control (n=72,480) P
4.80 ±2.50 <0.001
40.7 ±21.1 0.155
4259 5.9 <0.001
11,613 16.0
8918 12.3
9949 13.7
10,985 15.2
10,577 14.6
8845 12.2
7334 10.1
46,758 64.5 <0.001
25,722 35.5
22,360 61.7 0.744
5989 16.5
7891 21.8
34,693 47.9 0.007
11,994 16.6
10,384 14.3
8639 11.9
6670 9.3
0.184
19,853 27.4
18,851 26.0
15,533 21.4
18,243 25.2
<0.001
15,506 21.4
10,194 14.1
9867 13.6
9330 12.9
9494 13.1
8865 12.23
9224 12.73
72,480 66.7
Table 2
Length of stay for hospitals by case and control (mean, SD).
Variables
Case (n=39,364)
P
Control (n=72,480)
P
Before intervention,
2007.1–2012.6
After intervention,
2012.7–2014.6
Before intervention,
2007.1–2012.6
After intervention,
2012.7–2014.6
Age
<10 4.71 ±2.21 4.41 ±2.04 0.013 4.62 ±2.58 4.66 ±3.23 0.711
10–19 5.21 ±1.87 5.12 ±1.80 0.117 5.08 ±1.96 4.91 ±1.91 <0.0001
20–29 5.23 ±2.07 5.13 ±1.89 0.177 4.79 ±2.11 4.41 ±2.00 <0.0001
30–39 5.28 ±2.21 5.05 ±2.03 0.001 4.69 ±2.26 4.43 ±2.40 <0.0001
40–49 5.41 ±2.47 5.09 ±2.20 <0.0001 4.75 ±2.51 4.54 ±2.46 <0.0001
50–59 5.57 ±2.75 5.09 ±2.38 <0.0001 4.83 ±2.62 4.53 ±2.60 <0.0001
60–67 5.47 ±2.58 5.01 ±2.43 <0.0001 4.84 ±2.83 4.70 ±3.00 0.044
≥70 5.69 ±2.98 5.15 ±2.80 <0.0001 5.16 ±3.02 4.77 ±3.13 <0.0001
Sex
Male 5.23 ±2.38 4.90 ±2.26 <0.0001 4.67 ±2.45 4.41 ±2.56 <0.0001
Female 5.55 ±2.44 5.35 ±2.16 <0.0001 5.18 ±2.46 5.02 ±2.58 <0.0001
Principal diagnosis
Appendectomy 5.75 ±2.27 5.61 ±2.12 <0.0001 5.66 ±2.36 5.58 ±2.53 0.002
Hernia procedures 4.93 ±2.23 4.38 ±2.22 <0.0001 3.91 ±2.22 3.50 ±2.28 <0.0001
Hemorrhoid procedures 4.53 ±2.61 4.07 ±2.07 <0.0001 3.16 ±1.70 3.02 ±1.61 <0.0001
Charlson comorbidity index
0 5.17 ±2.07 5.03 ±1.93 <0.0001 4.84 ±2.18 4.61 ±2.26 <0.0001
1 5.40 ±2.44 5.06 ±2.19 <0.0001 4.74 ±2.49 4.49 ±2.41 <0.0001
2 5.56 ±2.72 5.09 ±2.37 <0.0001 4.82 ±2.64 4.57 ±2.68 <0.0001
3 5.49 ±2.57 4.98 ±2.37 <0.0001 4.86 ±2.80 4.68 ±2.96 0.011
≥4 5.74 ±3.11 5.23 ±2.90 <0.0001 5.22 ±3.11 4.83 ±3.19 <0.0001
Season
Spring 5.34 ±2.41 5.10 ±2.24 <0.0001 4.85 ±2.44 4.57 ±2.52 <0.0001
Summer 5.35 ±2.37 5.01 ±2.27 <0.0001 4.90 ±2.45 4.68 ±2.64 <0.0001
Autumn 5.37 ±2.37 5.14 ±2.29 <0.0001 4.90 ±2.49 4.67 ±2.58 <0.0001
Winter 5.35 ±2.46 5.02 ±2.13 <0.0001 4.77 ±2.48 4.57 ±2.58 <0.0001
Period
2007.1–2008.6 5.64 ±2.36 <0.0001 5.00 ±2.51 <0.0001
2008.7–2009.6 5.45 ±2.31 4.88 ±2.37
2009.7–2010.6 5.28 ±2.43 4.83 ±2.45
2010.7–2011.6 5.14 ±2.43 4.79 ±2.51
2011.7–2012.6 5.09 ±2.46 4.68 ±2.45
2012.7–2013.6 4.98 ±2.16 4.64 ±2.57
2013.7–2014.6 5.14 ±2.30 4.60 ±2.59
Hospital type
General hospital 5.33 ±2.38 5.04 ±2.23 <0.0001 5.47 ±2.37 5.42 ±2.51 0.092
Hospital 5.79 ±2.80 5.47 ±2.34 0.031 4.26 ±2.41 3.87 ±2.41 <0.0001
Hospital ownership
Public 5.40 ±2.38 5.12 ±2.21 <0.0001 – – – –
Corporation 5.03 ±2.50 4.70 ±2.38 <0.0001 5.51 ±2.48 5.44 ±2.58 0.033
Private – – – – 4.37 ±2.34 3.99 ±2.40 <0.0001
Teaching status
Teaching 5.72 ±2.39 5.33 ±2.28 <0.0001 5.35 ±2.29 5.45 ±2.44 0.007
Non-teaching 5.19 ±2.39 4.95 ±2.20 <0.0001 4.67 ±2.50 4.32 ±2.56 <0.0001
Region
Urban 5.48 ±2.57 5.03 ±2.43 <0.0001 4.61 ±2.46 4.37 ±2.57 <0.0001
Rural 5.30 ±2.33 5.08 ±2.14 <0.0001 5.56 ±2.35 5.39 ±2.47 <0.0001
Number of beds (means)
<300 beds 5.16 ±2.33 4.92 ±2.06 <0.0001 4.53 ±2.47 4.13 ±2.49 <0.0001
300–499 beds 5.61 ±2.34 5.76 ±2.37 0.022 5.54 ±2.00 5.29 ±1.86 <0.0001
500–700 beds 5.72 ±2.52 5.22 ±2.38 <0.0001 5.16 ±2.36 5.24 ±2.72 0.347
Total 5.35 ±2.40 5.06 ±2.23 <0.0001 4.85 ±2.46 4.62 ±2.58 <0.0001
Jang et al. Medicine (2016) 95:37 www.md-journal.comfor propensity score matching with 1:2 ratio samples. Tables S2
and S3, http://links.lww.com/MD/B274, in the Appendix report
general admission characteristics before and after propensity
score matching by period.
Average LOS was signiﬁcantly higher in cases compared with
controls. There were no signiﬁcant differences in average age
between cases and controls (40.8 vs 40.7 years, respectively).5Over 60% of patients were male in both groups. Although we
performed propensity score matching, the proportion of CCI
classes remained signiﬁcantly different between cases and
controls; however, the proportion of each CCI level is more
similar between groups than before matching was applied.
Table 2 reports LOS for case and control hospitals stratiﬁed by
several variables. Before implementation of the KDPC system,
Table 3
Results of the segmented regression analysis with control for length of stay (LOS).
Parameter Estimate SE 95% Conﬁdence limits P
Intercept b 3.164 0.367 2.445 3.883 <.0001
Baseline trend 0.002 0.004 0.010 0.005 0.5827
Level change 0.012 0.061 0.132 0.108 0.8450
Trend change 0.004 0.006 0.016 0.009 0.5877
Difference between case and control 0.186 0.268 0.339 0.711 0.4872
Baseline trend of difference between case and control 0.007 0.003 0.014 0.000 0.0412
Level change of difference between case and control 0.117 0.150 0.412 0.178 0.4366
Trend change of difference between case and control 0.025 0.009 0.008 0.043 0.0055
Age 0.016 0.002 0.013 0.018 <.0001
Sex Male 0.099 0.019 0.136 0.063 <.0001
Female ref.
Sub-DRG G081 3.922 0.223 3.485 4.360 <.0001
G082 1.154 0.144 0.872 1.435 <.0001
G083 2.896 0.390 2.132 3.661 <.0001
G084 0.906 0.154 0.604 1.207 <.0001
G095 0.463 0.307 1.064 0.138 0.1308
G096 0.077 0.200 0.469 0.316 0.7028
G097 0.606 0.357 1.304 0.093 0.0895
G098 0.216 0.331 0.432 0.865 0.5129
G102 0.146 0.082 0.016 0.307 0.0766
G104 1.058 0.171 1.393 0.722 <.0001
G105 0.347 0.240 0.818 0.123 0.1477
G106 ref.
Charlson comorbidity index 0 0.163 0.095 0.350 0.023 0.0858
1 0.247 0.087 0.417 0.076 0.0047
2 0.234 0.076 0.384 0.085 0.0021
3 0.247 0.050 0.346 0.148 <.0001
≥4 ref.
Hospital type General hospital 0.118 0.291 0.452 0.688 0.6846
Hospital ref.
Hospital ownership Public 0.454 0.358 0.247 1.156 0.2044
Corporation 0.365 0.277 0.179 0.909 0.1885
Private ref.
Teaching status Teaching 0.584 0.190 0.212 0.955 0.0021
Non-teaching ref.
Region Urban 0.034 0.224 0.472 0.405 0.8808
Rural ref.
Season Spring 0.049 0.017 0.083 0.015 0.0045
Summer 0.044 0.021 0.086 0.003 0.0378
Autumn 0.038 0.025 0.086 0.011 0.1275
Winter ref.
Year 2007 0.143 0.261 0.368 0.654 0.5832
2008 0.118 0.217 0.307 0.543 0.5849
2009 0.059 0.194 0.321 0.438 0.7612
2010 0.115 0.157 0.194 0.423 0.4654
2011 0.059 0.131 0.197 0.315 0.6509
2012 0.020 0.118 0.252 0.212 0.8634
2013 0.067 0.064 0.059 0.193 0.2962
2014 ref.
Number of beds 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.004 <.0001
Number of doctors 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.003 <.0001
Number of nurses 0.005 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.0005
DRG=diagnosis-related group, SE= standard error.
Jang et al. Medicine (2016) 95:37 Medicineaverage LOSwas 5.35 days (SD=2.40) among cases and4.85 days
(SD=2.46) among controls. After implementation of the KDPC
system, average LOS was 5.06 days (SD=2.23) among cases and
4.62 days (SD=2.58) among controls. LOS increased with
increasing age, and LOS was longer among female patients
compared with male patients. Appendectomy had the longest LOS
andherniaprocedures had the second longestLOS.LOSwas longer
for higher CCI. Average LOS decreased over time from January
2007 to June 2014 (described in Table S5, http://links.lww.com/6MD/B274). LOS was longer at general hospitals compared with
hospitals among cases. In contrast, among controls, LOS was
longer at hospitals compared with general hospitals. LOS was
longer in teaching hospitals comparedwith non-teaching hospitals.
Average LOS was longer at rural hospitals compared with urban
hospitals among controls; there was no signiﬁcant difference in
LOS between urban and rural hospitals among cases.
Table 3 reports the results of the segmented regression analysis
with control for case and control LOS. The estimate for baseline
Table 4
Results of the segmented regression analysis with control for length of stay (LOS) by diagnosis-related group (DRG).
Parameter Estimate SE 95% Conﬁdence limits P
Appendectomy
Intercept b 5.551 0.535 4.503 6.598 <.0001
Baseline trend 0.002 0.005 0.012 0.008 0.6720
Level change 0.037 0.074 0.109 0.182 0.6222
Trend change 0.004 0.009 0.021 0.013 0.6151
Difference between case and control 0.042 0.235 0.419 0.502 0.8598
Baseline trend of difference between case and control 0.005 0.004 0.012 0.003 0.2680
Level change of difference between case and control 0.161 0.176 0.506 0.184 0.3595
Trend change of difference between case and control 0.021 0.011 0.000 0.041 0.0496
Hernia procedures
Intercept b 0.762 0.743 0.695 2.219 0.3051
Baseline trend 0.017 0.008 0.033 0.001 0.0376
Level change 0.129 0.149 0.421 0.163 0.3862
Trend change 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.037 0.3480
Difference between case and control 0.131 0.407 0.928 0.666 0.7472
Baseline trend of difference between case and control 0.015 0.005 0.025 0.005 0.0033
Level change of difference between case and control 0.091 0.218 0.337 0.519 0.6772
Trend change of difference between case and control 0.040 0.014 0.011 0.068 0.0058
Hemorrhoid procedures
Intercept b 2.734 0.596 1.567 3.902 <.0001
Baseline trend 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.019 0.3373
Level change 0.011 0.091 0.190 0.168 0.9071
Trend change 0.012 0.009 0.030 0.006 0.1837
Difference between case and control 0.646 0.369 0.077 1.369 0.0800
Baseline trend of difference between case and control 0.010 0.006 0.022 0.002 0.1027
Level change of difference between case and control 0.196 0.285 0.755 0.363 0.4914
Trend change of difference between case and control 0.022 0.017 0.012 0.055 0.2072
Adjusted age, sex, Charlson comorbidity index (CCI), hospital type, hospital ownership, teaching status season, year, number of bed, number of doctor, and number of nurse.
SE= standard error.
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0.0412), reﬂects a trend in the difference in LOS between
cases and controls prior to KDPC implementation. The
estimate for level change in difference between cases and
controls reﬂects a difference in the change of LOS between
cases and controls at the time of KDPC implementation. As
reported in Table 3, the difference in LOS between cases and
controls was as much as 0.117 days at the time of KDPC
implementation, but was not statistically signiﬁcant (P=
0.4366). The estimate for trend change in difference between
cases and controls reﬂects the change in trend difference in
LOS between cases and controls after implementation. Thus,
an estimate of 0.025 indicates that the trend difference in LOS
between cases and controls was an increase of 0.025 days (p=
0.0055) compared with baseline.
Table 4 reports the results of the segmented regression analysis
with control for LOS stratiﬁed by DRG. The estimate for trend
change in difference between cases and controls is 0.021 (P=
0.0496) for appendectomy and 0.040 (P=0.0058) for hernia
procedures. In addition, the estimate for baseline trend in
difference between cases and controls is 0.015 (P=0.0033). No
signiﬁcant estimates were found for hemorrhoid procedures.
The time-series graph in Fig. 2A reports average LOS for total
admissions stratiﬁed by month. Red dots represent monthly
average LOS for cases and blue dots represent average LOS for
controls. The red dotted line represents the average standard LOS
(4.89 days) for KDPC admissions, and the blue dotted line
represents the average standard LOS (5.20 days) for DRG
admissions. LOS consistently decreased among controls, whereas
LOS decreased among cases and then increased following KDPC
implementation.7Time-series graphs for 3 surgical DRGs are shown in Fig. 2B,
C, and D. For appendectomy, LOS trend lines overlapped
between cases and controls (Fig. 2B). However, after adjusting
for confounding variables, an increasing trend in LOS was
observed after KDPC implementation among cases. An increas-
ing trend in LOS among cases after KDPC implementation is
more obvious for hernia procedures (Fig. 2C). The trend change
is relatively small in hemorrhoid procedures compared with other
DRGs (Fig. 2D).
We performed subgroup analyses to determine which
subgroup was more inﬂuenced by KDPC implementation.
Subgroup analyses were performed for total, appendectomy,
hernia, and hemorrhoid procedures. We used Equation 1 to
evaluate statistically signiﬁcant differences among subgroups.
Results of subgroup analyses for CCI and hospital type are
reported in Table 5 and Fig. 3.
Table 5 reports the results of the segmented regression analysis
with control for LOS stratiﬁed by CCI subgroup and hospital
type subgroup, respectively. Among total admissions, those with
a higher CCI exhibited a higher increasing trend change in LOS
(CCI 0, 1: 0.022, P=0.0142; CCI 2, 3: 0.026, P=0.0288; CCI≥
4: 0.055, P=0.0003). Among appendectomy admissions, only
the CCI≥4 subgroup exhibited a statistically signiﬁcant estimate
for trend change in difference between cases and controls (0.077,
P=0.0044). Among hernia procedure admissions, all CCI
subgroups exhibited a statistically signiﬁcant increasing trend
change (CCI 0, 1: 0.033, P=0.0361; CCI 2, 3: 0.049, P=0.0045;
CCI≥4: 0.043, P=0.0379).
Among total admissions, the estimate for trend change in
difference between cases and controls was signiﬁcant for the
general hospital subgroup (0.030, P=0.0048). Similarly, for
Figure 2. The length of stay (LOS) during 90 months. (A) LOS of 3 surgical diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). (B–D) LOS of appendectomy, hernia procedure, and
hemorrhoid procedures, respectively.
Table 5
Results of the segmented regression analysis with control for length of stay (LOS) by CCI subgroup.
Level change of difference between
public and private
Trend change of difference
between public and private
Estimate SE P Estimate SE P
By CCI subgroup Total 0, 1 0.163 0.15 0.2794 0.022 0.009 0.0142
2, 3 0.148 0.204 0.469 0.026 0.012 0.0288
≥4 0.161 0.221 0.4664 0.055 0.015 0.0003
Appendectomy 0, 1 0.181 0.169 0.2855 0.019 0.01 0.0608
2, 3 0.068 0.254 0.7891 0.018 0.016 0.2422
≥4 0.27 0.563 0.6308 0.077 0.027 0.0044
Hernia procedures 0, 1 0.038 0.263 0.8844 0.033 0.016 0.0361
2, 3 0.021 0.312 0.9465 0.049 0.017 0.0045
≥4 0.243 0.286 0.3965 0.043 0.021 0.0379
Hemorrhoid procedures 0, 1 0.179 0.282 0.5254 0.021 0.016 0.1927
2, 3 0.329 0.357 0.3556 0.012 0.021 0.5545
≥4 0.289 0.436 0.5072 0.066 0.037 0.0721
By hospital type subgroup Total General hospital 0.097 0.163 0.5512 0.030 0.011 0.0048
Hospital 0.398 0.408 0.3291 0.010 0.023 0.6513
Appendectomy General hospital 0.094 0.183 0.6082 0.024 0.012 0.0447
Hospital 0.668 0.488 0.1709 0.024 0.019 0.1982
Hernia procedures General hospital 0.089 0.225 0.6938 0.043 0.017 0.0091
Hospital 2.589 1.182 0.0285 0.125 0.029 <.0001
Hemorrhoid procedures General hospital 1.086 0.318 0.0006 0.004 0.024 0.8645
Hospital 0.307 0.352 0.383 0.03 0.02 0.1277
CCI=Charlson comorbidity index, SE= standard error.
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Figure 3. The results of the segmented regression analysis for length of stay
(LOS) by Charlson comorbidity index (CCI) and hospital type subgroup.
Jang et al. Medicine (2016) 95:37 www.md-journal.comappendectomy admissions, the estimate for trend change in
difference between cases and controls was statistically signiﬁcant
for the general hospital subgroup only (0.024, P=0.0447). In
contrast, for hernia procedures, the trend change estimates for
both the general hospital and hospital subgroups were statisti-
cally signiﬁcant (general hospital: 0.043, P=0.0091; hospital:
0.125, P=< 0.001). Signiﬁcant level changes in difference
between cases and controls were also observed for hernia
procedures among the hospital subtype (2.589, P=0.0285) and
for hemorrhoid procedures among the general hospital subtype
(1.086, P=0.0006).
Figure 3 shows the estimate values of level and trend changes in
the difference between cases and controls from Table 5 as a bar
graph.4. Discussion
The results of this study suggest that the payment system change
from DRG to KDPC increased LOS. However, this effect was not
consistent across 3 surgical DRGs and was signiﬁcant for
appendectomy and hernia procedures only. Compared with the
other two surgical DRGs, hemorrhoid procedures are relatively
noninvasive, LOS is usually short, emergency procedures or
complex cases are relatively rare, and the level of surgical
difﬁculty is low (based on the relative value resource-based scale,
RVRBS). Although we cannot conclude that these characteristics
contributed to the result observed in the current study, we cannot
conceive of other reasons for differences. If the difference is
associated with DRG invasiveness, then the severity of admission
may also have a similar association with the impact.
The results of stratiﬁed analysis by severity (i.e., CCI) are
consistent with this expectation. The impact of the payment
system change on the trend change in LOS is twice as high in the
highest severity group (CCI≥4: 0.055) compared with the lowest
severity group (CCI 0, 1: 0.022). This result is observed for each
DRG subtype in the stratiﬁed analysis by severity degree. This
association is also observed for the hospital type subgroup
analysis. General hospitals are larger than hospitals. In addition,9more patient cases are generally admitted to general hospitals.
Therefore, our hypothesis that the payment system change would
have more of an impact on high severity cases (or complex
procedures) is appropriate.
It is unclear, however, why LOS among more severe cases is
more susceptible to payment system change. The transition from
a DRG- to KDPC-based payment system reduces the incentive to
decrease LOS. According to Ishii,[24] the fee schedule structure of
DRG provides more incentives for decreasing LOS than the
Japanese DPC. Given that the fee schedule structure of KDPC is
very similar to the original Japanese DPC, we can infer that
incentives to decrease LOS are attenuated in the KDPC-based
system.
Despite the attenuated incentives for decreasing LOS in the
KDPC compared with the DRG, the structure of the KDPC fee
schedule is per diem, with proﬁt maximized for shorter LOS.
Therefore, an increase in LOS due to a change in the payment
system means that the payment system change also is associated
with proﬁt minimization. There exists, therefore, a trade-off
between decreasing LOS and proﬁt maximization between the
DRG- and KDPC-based payment systems. The impact of this
trade-off is the greatest for high severity admission cases.
Although it is difﬁcult to deﬁne what an appropriate LOS is, the
fact that LOS increased only in high severity cases suggests that
the DRG system provides excessive incentives to reduce LOS for
high severity cases.
This increase in LOS should be interpreted differently than the
LOS decrease that was observed following the payment system
change from FFS toDRG. Under FFS, long LOS is associatedwith
proﬁt maximization, whereas long LOS is associated with a
decrease in average proﬁts under KDCP. Therefore, increasing
LOS in the present study suggests that the DRG-based system
promotes excessive decreases in LOS in certain situations in
Korea.
There are several reasons for the observation of LOS decrease
under DRG but not KDPC. First, the ﬁnancial incentives for LOS
decrease are higher for DRG than KDPC. In Fig. 2, the blue
dotted line, which represents the standard average LOS for DRG,
was located above the blue dot that represents the real average
LOS for that month. This ﬁnding indicates that money was saved
under the DRG-based system, because the DRG fee schedule is
designed to compensate costs during standard LOS. Despite these
savings, however, average LOS continuously decreases under the
DRG-based system. In contrast, the red dotted line, which
represents the average standard LOS for three surgical DRGs
under the KDCP-based system, is located mainly below the red
dots during the KDPC period (2012.7–2014. 6). KDPC
admissions with LOS longer than the standard LOS incur a
ﬁnancial penalty due to the decreasing per-diem fee schedule.
Despite this penalty, we observed that average LOS increases
under the KDPC-based system. If LOS increase is due to ﬁnancial
incentives, then LOS should not increase over the standard LOS.
Therefore, differences in ﬁnancial incentives alone cannot explain
the results of our study.
A second possible explanation is the contribution of “checks
and balances.” “Checks and balances” refers to the balance
between the medical decisions of the physicians and the pressure
of the hospital manager. Unlike in the United States, physicians’
fees and hospital fees are not separate in Korea. In addition, the
medical fees of the NHI are relatively low compared with the
United States. Therefore, the physician’s decision has less of an
impact than the manager’s decision. Thus, in contrast to FFS or a
per-diem fee schedule, which gives more power to the physician’s
Jang et al. Medicine (2016) 95:37 Medicineprofessional decision, checks and balances are more difﬁcult to
achieve under a DRG-based system.[25,26] Checks and balances
may be easier to achieve under KDPC due to structural
differences in the payment system. However, Kwon insists that
a checks and balances structure is meaningless in Korea, because
most physicians are employed by the hospital and there are few
checks and balances between the hospital and the physician in
terms of quality, which is in contrast to the attending system in
the United States.[8] Therefore, to identify the existence and
action of checks and balances in Korea, other indexes about
health care outcomes or processes, such as spending resources
and mortality, should be investigated in future studies.
Although KDPC is a per-diem based payment system, there is
also incentive to decrease LOS under KDPC because its fee
schedule is designed to provide more incentives during the early
admission period. Compared with DRG, the incentive scale of
KDPC is relatively small due to the FFS component. Therefore,
the incentive for LOS decrease is not as strong for KDPC
compared with DRG. However, KDPC may be sufﬁcient for
reducing LOS comprehensively in Korea, if LOS reduction is not
the sole purpose for a payment system change.
This study has several limitations. First, case hospitals included
only public (and quasi-public) hospitals and control hospitals
included only private hospitals. To minimize this problem, we
used time-series analysis and sampled individuals using propen-
sity score matching.
Second, we did not assess other factors that may be affected by
the payment system change, such as costs or supplied services,
due to lack of data. KDPC fee schedule includes more expensive
services that are not included in the DRG schedule. Therefore,
comparing claim costs only between KDPC and DRG is
meaningless. However, LOS is an index that reﬂects medical
service supply. Given that the aim of this study was to compare
two bundled payment systems to provide evidence for the
development of an appropriate reimbursement system, we think
that LOS may be an appropriate and sufﬁcient dependent
variable for this study.
Finally, we analyzed only 3 surgical DRGs. More DRGs,
especially medical DRGs, should be explored in future studies.
The results of this study provide important evidence regarding the
impact of payment system change on surgical DRGs.5. Conclusion
Average LOS for surgical DRG admissions increased following
payment system change from DRG to KDPC. This LOS increase
was observed speciﬁcally for complex procedure admissions and
high severity cases. Although both payment systems are
optimized to decrease LOS, incentives to reduce LOS are
stronger under the DRG system than the KDPC system.
Therefore, these ﬁndings suggest that incentives under the
DRG lead to excessive LOS decrease in Korea.
Further increases in medical spending are expected due to the
aging population, development of new medical technology, and
higher standards of living. A provider-side cost-sharing payment
system will be introduced in the future, because payment system
changes have been met with low resistance by patients, and have
introduced few burdens compared to other policy changes. We
have already implemented DRG and KDPC, and the new
payment system, which is based on these 2 bundled payment
systems, is expected to be the next national payment system in
Korea. A change in the national payment system should be
undertaken with caution because enrollment of all medical10institutions in the NHI is compulsory. We suggest that policy-
makers and stakeholders should focus on the development of an
appropriate reimbursement system that focuses on more than
cost containment, saving resources, or LOS reduction. More
evidence and studies that focus on associations between payment
systems and medical outcomes, resource spending, and quality
will be needed to achieve this goal.
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